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WHAT KIND OF FINANCE SHOULD
THERE BE?
SAULE T. OMAROVA*
I
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, most developed economies around the world have been
increasingly exhibiting a particular structural trend popularly labeled
“financialization.”1 On the most general level, this capacious term refers to the
“increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international
economies.”2 Although academics working in various disciplines began exploring
the many facets of financialization well before the global financial crisis of 2008,
the crisis gave these efforts a new sense of urgency.3 The crisis vividly
demonstrated the far-reaching and devastating socioeconomic and political
consequences of allowing the financial system to grow increasingly large, risky,
and complex.
In the economic literature, the crisis has revived a long-standing debate on
the causal link between growth of the financial system, on the one hand, and
broader economic growth, on the other.4 As an influential paper by Arcand,
Berkes, and Panizza put it, the crisis “raised concerns that some countries may
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1. For a succinct analysis of the current debate on, and the underlying dynamics of, financialization,
see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1211–
15 (2017) [hereinafter Finance Franchise].
2. GERALD A. EPSTEIN, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2005).
3. See, e.g., id.; GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS 27–28 (2011); Ken-Hou Lin &
Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOC.
1284 (2013); Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters (The Levy Econ. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 525, Dec. 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm/ ?abstract_id=1077923
[https://perma.cc/FTU2-EFVA]; Ing-Haw Cheng & Wei Xiong, The Financialization of Commodity
Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Reeach, Working Paper No. 19642, Oct. 2013), http://papers./
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_/ id=2350243 [https://perma.cc/2JJP-MUUZ].
4. For examples of the pre-crisis economic literature on this subject, see generally Robert G. King
& Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 108 Q.J. ECON. 717 (1993); Ross Levine
et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes, 46 J. MONETARY ECON. 31 (2000);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559
(1998).
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have financial systems which are ‘too large’ compared to the size of the domestic
economy.”5 Provocatively titled Too Much Finance?, their paper shows that there
can be “too much” finance, insofar as excessive growth of total private-sector
credit has a negative effect on economic growth.6 The paper generated a great
deal of public interest and discussion,7 as well as subsequent research supporting
and elaborating its findings.8
This Article takes the economic literature on the relationship between the
size of the financial sector and economic growth as a starting point for broadening
and deepening the inquiry into the qualitative aspects of their relationship.
Adopting a deliberately law and policy oriented perspective, it shifts the
discussion beyond the economists’ question “Can there be too much finance?” to
the bigger and more complicated question, “What kind of finance should there
be?” This Article’s purpose is to engage in a high-level exploration of an effective
macro-systemic approach to financial markets and regulation, which explicitly
ties together the traditionally technical issues of financial stability and innovation
and the broader issues of sustainable and structurally-balanced socioeconomic
development.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a conceptual framing for the
discussion by shifting its focus from quantitative to qualitative aspects of the
complex interrelationship between finance and macro-economy. It accordingly
defines the core inquiry not in terms of measuring the size of the financial sector
vis-à-vis total economic output, but in terms of unpacking the complex
interdependency between the internal dynamics of finance and the levels of
socioeconomic development enabled by it. Applying this macro-systemic
approach, Part III examines the popular but under-theorized concept of financial
innovation from the perspective of its potential impact on productive economic
enterprise. Tracing the flow of causality from macro-economy back to finance,
Part IV then explores the potential impact of a well-designed strategy of
economic development on the long-term stability and resilience of the financial
system.

5. Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes & Ugo Panizza, Too Much Finance? 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper WP/12/161, June 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12161.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PH6Q-GCQM].
6. Specifically, their paper finds that “finance starts having a negative effect on output growth when
credit to the private sector reaches 100% of GDP.” Id. at 1.
7. See, e.g., Joe Pinsker, Does Finance Do Any Good For Society? THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/does-finance-benefit-society/385176/
[https://
perma.cc/934U-L86J]; Martin Wolf, Why Finance Is Too Much of a Good Thing, FT. COM (May 26, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/64c2f03a-03a0-11e5-a70f-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/9KQX-C3LY].
8. See, e.g., Ratna Sahay et al., Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging
Markets, (Int’l Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note SDN/15/08, May 2015), https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1508.pdf [https://perma.cc/42NA-F3Y4]; Luigi Zingales, Does Finance
Benefit Society? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 20894, Jan. 2015), https://www.nber/
.org/papers/w20894.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR4S-SDTD].
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II
FINANCE AND THE ECONOMY: A MACRO-SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE
A. Asking the Right Question: From “How Much?” to “What Kind?”
Answering the question in the title of this Article requires a conceptual
framework: a coherent narrative of what the financial system is and how it
functions. The currently dominant narrative defines the essential function and
dynamics of the financial system in terms of “financial intermediation.” In this
orthodox picture, the financial system enables the flow of scarce funds from one
group of private actors (“savers” or “surplus units”) to another group of private
and public actors (“users” or “deficit units”), with the risk-mitigating assistance
of professional “intermediaries.”9 Government instrumentalities are relegated to
performing “mainly secondary functions, regulating and otherwise supporting
the operation of the essentially private financial marketplace from the outside.”10
Its ubiquity notwithstanding, this financial intermediation orthodoxy
provides only a partial—and unavoidably distorted—view of what actually
happens in the financial system. In fact, the modern financial system is more
accurately described as a public-private franchise arrangement, in which private
financial institutions—“franchisees”—are licensed to manage the distribution of
the sovereign public’s—the “franchisor’s”—full faith and credit.11 The
fundamental purpose of this franchise arrangement is to supply the macroeconomy with sufficient credit to support productive enterprise. That involves
both “(1) maintaining appropriate aggregates of credit, and (2) allocating that
credit—in each case, to ensure full utilization of the economy’s productive
capacity.”12 Because of its superior ability to take a macro-level view, the
sovereign public, acting primarily through the central bank, performs the task of
modulating the credit supply. The task of allocating capital to specific uses,
however, is reserved for private actors, with their ostensibly superior ability to
gather and process vital market information at the micro level.13
From this perspective, “financialization” emerges as a dysfunctional mode of
interaction between the financial system and the real (that is, non-financial)
economy, in which an ever-greater proportion of capital flows is continuously reabsorbed by the former rather than flowing to the latter. Causally, it reflects both

9. For textbook versions of this narrative, see ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 22–
23 (2000); BARBARA CASU ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BANKING 18 (2006); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL
ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 37 (5th ed. 2013); STEPHEN G. CECHETTI & KERMIT
SCHOENHOLTZ, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 39 (3d ed. 2008); STUART I.
GREENBAUM & ANJAN V. THAKOR, CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 55–58 (2007);
KENT MATHEWS & JOHN THOMPSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BANKING 33 (2005).
10. Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1145.
11. For a comprehensive theoretical account of the structure and operation of the U.S. financial
system as a public-private franchise arrangement, see id.
12. Id. at 1213.
13. Id. For more on the modulation task, see generally Robert C. Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for
Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010).
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(1) the failure of the central bank to modulate credit aggregates in a manner that
prevents excess private credit-generation; and (2) the systematic misallocation of
credit by private financial institutions diverting it to uses other than investment
in productive enterprise.
These interrelated and mutually-reinforcing dysfunctionalities provide a
conceptual explanation for why there can be “too much finance.” Most obviously,
it would happen in situations where the relevant monetary authorities are unable
or unwilling to impose effective constraints on the growth of private credit
beyond what is needed to ensure full utilization of the economy’s productive
capacity. This over-generation of credit is a major cause of financial instability
and, ultimately, slower economic growth. The financial crisis of 2008, followed by
an economic recession and political turmoil, is a vivid example of these dynamics.
The intimate interconnection between credit modulation and credit
allocation, however, renders this quantity-focused explanation inherently
incomplete. In practice, systemically destabilizing asset price booms stem directly
from—and reinforce—socially suboptimal allocative decisions by private
financial market participants. It is well known, for example, that one of the
principal causes of the 2008 financial crisis was the unrestrained flow of
speculative investment into the U.S. housing sector. By allowing this systematic
misallocation of credit and the concomitant accumulation of hidden leverage to
continue unabated until the market could no longer sustain it, the Federal
Reserve effectively abandoned its modulatory function and ceded control over
credit supply to private actors.14 The inevitable market collapse in the fall of 2008,
in effect, exposed these dysfunctional dynamics on both sides of the publicprivate division of roles in today’s financial system.
Yet, in the post-2008 world, both the actual regulatory reforms in the financial
sector and the academic debate on financial stability and crisis prevention
continue to focus almost entirely on one side of this dual-track problem: how to
modulate credit aggregates more effectively. Thus, the bulk of post-crisis
regulatory reforms aim principally to reduce the danger of over-leveraging—and
thus excessive risk-taking—on the part of individual banks and other financial
institutions.15 In this sense, the evolving arsenal of post-crisis solutions to the
financial system’s dysfunctions consists mainly of traditional microprudential
regulatory tools—such as capital adequacy ratios, liquidity requirements, and
consolidated oversight—strengthened and repurposed as post-crisis tools of
macroprudential regulation and supervision.16

14. See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1214.
15. For an overview of these reforms, see Saule T. Omarova, The “Too Big To Fail” Problem, 103
MINN. L. REV. 2495, 2504–10 (2019).
16. For background information on macroprudential regulation, see generally INT’L MONETARY
FUND, MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY: AN ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK (2011), https://www.imf.org/ext/
ernal/np/pp/eng/2011/031411.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5LG-8TQF]; Robert C. Hockett, The
Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in
Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015); Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner,
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The newly-intensified academic debate on the proper scope and tools of
monetary policy represents another aspect of the post-crisis push to improve
central banks’ ability to modulate credit on an economy-wide basis. To great
extent, the current resurgence of interest in this notoriously technical subject is a
reaction to the dramatic growth of central banks’ balance sheets as a result of
their crisis containment and rescue actions, as well as the continuing expansion
of their de facto mandates in the post-crisis era. The post-crisis attempts to
stimulate economic growth by keeping interest rates at or even below zero
further escalated and politicized these discussions.17
A closely related strand in the ongoing reform debate focuses on the proper
methods of backstopping the financial system in the event central banks’ and
other regulators’ modulation efforts prove ineffective. These include, for
example, the post-crisis creation of special “orderly liquidation” regimes and
creditor “bail-in” requirements for systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs). However, the key method of “panic-proofing” the system seems to
require some form of extended guaranteed access to central banks’ liquidity
backup and other infrastructural support facilities.18
In sum, preventing excess accumulations of leverage in the financial system—
or the modulation task—remains the primary driver of the post-crisis process of
debating, devising, and implementing regulatory reforms. By contrast, to date,
there has been no meaningful debate on improving the system-wide allocation of
financial resources to productive enterprise.19 In most, if not all, post-crisis
discussions on financial regulation, the underlying presumption remains that
private market actors are inherently better at assessing financial risks and
spotting potentially beneficial investment opportunities “on the ground.”
Accordingly, the existing dysfunctions in the process of system-wide credit
allocation are framed predominantly in terms of specific private incentive
misalignments or more general political-economy frictions.20
This one-sided approach to making the financial system “safer” invisibly and
inevitably undermines the efficacy of the post-crisis regulatory reform process.
Despite the ongoing efforts to strengthen macroprudential oversight of financial
Macroprudential Policy⎯A Literature Review (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 337, 2011),
www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG2-W4AR].
17. See, e.g., Bill Dudley, Fed Shouldn’t Enable Donald Trump, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-08-27/the-fed-shouldn-t-enable-donaldtrump?srnd=opinion [https://perma.cc/DK5G-4YW7].
18. See, e.g., PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE
DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2010); HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION (2016); Kathryn
Judge, The Guarantor of Last Resort, 97 TEX. L. REV. 707 (2019).
19. Thus, a recent strand in the corporate governance literature, advocating the so-called
“stakeholder” theory of a business corporation, could be viewed as dealing with issues of allocative
efficiency, but only indirectly and principally on a micro-level. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY (Jeffrey S. Harrison et al. ed., 2019) (providing a broad view of recent
scholarship in this area).
20. “Financial inclusion” and “access to credit” are perhaps the most representative themes in the
latter category.
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institutions and markets, persistent economy-wide misallocation of credit
continues to play a critical role in destabilizing the financial system. In fact, the
failure to recognize and remedy the deep-seated problems in the dynamics of
credit allocation keeps resurfacing in various contexts, feeding the antiregulatory rhetoric of “unanticipated consequences” of post-crisis reforms. For
example, one of the most frequently and successfully used deregulatory
arguments of the banking industry is that post-crisis macroprudential rules
constrain banks’ ability to extend credit to businesses, which directly impedes
economic growth. While obviously self-serving, this argument nevertheless hits
at a very real and systematic set of problems in the process of credit allocation.21
The recent rollback or significant softening of various provisions of the DoddFrank Act—including, in particular, the evolving regime of enhanced prudential
oversight of large bank holding companies and nonbank SIFIs—shows how
successfully this rhetoric is used in financial industry lobbying efforts.22
Instead of reversing the partial regulatory reforms already under way,
however, we should redirect our attention to this missing half of the solution to
the financial system’s fundamental problems. It means we need to start looking
at the interplay of financial stability and economic growth through the lens of
system-level capital allocation. In other words, we have to shift the policy debate
from the familiar question “Is there too much finance?” to the more meaningful
query: “What kind of finance should there be?”
B. Focusing the Inquiry: From “Growth” to “Development”
In order to focus this qualitative inquiry into the nature of finance, it is
important to define the other variable in the equation. The economic literature,
discussed above, examines the causal link between the size of the financial system
and economic growth, measured generally in quantitative terms. Purely
quantitative growth measures such as GDP, however, do not capture many
qualitative aspects of society’s material well-being, nor do they reflect key
structural factors that shape the relevant economy’s operation and determine its
ability to sustain growth in the long run.23 These factors include, among other
things, persistent sectoral imbalances, geographic concentrations of economic
activity, patterns of employment and related income levels, environmental
sustainability, population mobility, and access to and quality of public goods.
Financial resources may be allocated in ways that maintain, amplify, or
counteract these structural trends—and thus ultimately determine not only the
21. See Omarova, supra note 15, at 2519–21.
22. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 115-174, 132
Stat. 1296 (May 24, 2018), https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ174/PLAW-115publ174.pdf
[https://perma.cc/597W-SWVE] (repealing or significantly weakening various provisions of the DoddFrank Act).
23. See, e.g., Mijin Cha, What’s Missing From GDP?, DEMOS.ORG (Jan. 2013), https://www.demos./
org/sites/default/files/publications/GDP-Explainer.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB3G-S92Y]; Trouble With
GDP, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 30, 2016), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/04/30/the-troublewith-gdp [https://perma.cc/S5FC-YDQQ].
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quantity of wealth but also the pattern of wealth distribution in the polity. In that
sense, “getting finance right” is not merely a technocratic exercise: it involves
fundamental normative choices regarding the principal purposes and social
functions of finance.
It is, therefore, critical to focus the inquiry on the more expansive and multilayered concept of economic development, instead of the narrower notion of
growth. The difference, of course, is not merely semantic. Economic
development is not a static end-state but a continuous project. Development is a
conscious collective pursuit of qualitative—as opposed to purely quantitative—
growth and adaptation to new environments. Thus, any “developed” nation that
does not strive to develop risks losing its global competitive edge.24 In this sense,
economic development is not merely an aggregate outcome of the myriad of
micro-level transactions in private markets—it is an inherently political project.
Furthermore, this national developmental project is a fundamentally publicprivate enterprise. Contrary to an orthodox presumption, micro-optimizing by
private actors does not automatically lead to optimal macro-benefits for the
public; delivering such benefits requires an active pursuit of a coherent strategy.
As the ultimate public, collective actor, the government is in the best position to
formulate such a national developmental strategy.25 Successful implementation
of this strategy, moreover, would require the government to utilize, deliberately
and systematically, the tools of modern finance. Finance is the principal link
connecting the state and the market: it is both the lifeblood of the economy and
“the nerves of the state.”26 It is a universal productive input that can be moved
and deployed for a multitude of purposes.27 All of this makes finance a
particularly potent lever of economic and political power. It also makes it critical
that public instrumentalities act directly within the financial markets, as
endogenous market participants, as opposed to purely exogenous market
regulators.28
Of course, shifting the focus from quantitative growth metrics to qualitative
developmental factors immediately complicates the inquiry. What does, and what
does not, constitute a desirable developmental outcome in any particular context
is bound to be a contestable issue.29 This Article, however, neither advances a
comprehensive political agenda nor advocates any specific economic program.
The purpose here is to outline some of the core principles and constitutive
elements of an effective macro-systemic approach to financial markets and
24. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a
Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 115 (2015) [hereinafter Public Actors].
25. Id.
26. Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and
Development, in DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 10 (1999) (quoting Jean Bodin).
27. See JOHN ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND GROWTH: FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 76–77 (1983) (discussing the “universality” of finance as a policy
tool).
28. For an in-depth argument, see generally Public Actors, supra note 24.
29. See generally sources cited supra notes 24–27.
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regulation. It is inherently a meta-level exploration, an intellectual exercise in
framing—or reframing—the research agenda in the evolving area of law and
finance.
Three general points are worth emphasizing in this connection.
First, in order to uncover and examine the deeply complex structural and
relational linkages and interdependencies between the financial system and the
non-financial economy, it is crucial to shift the focus from the predominantly
micro-level, transactional phenomena to the more explicitly macro-level,
structural ones. Today, much of the academic and policy law-and-finance
discourse is methodologically and substantively grounded in, and revolves
around, fundamentally micro-level, transactional dynamics.
Even in the post-crisis era, the core tools of financial regulation—capital
adequacy rules, stress testing, resolution plans, limits on bank portfolio
concentrations, and even activity restrictions—continue to target individual
financial firms’ solvency and liquidity. In this sense, as noted above, the postcrisis emphasis on macro-prudential regulation is an incremental adjustment of
the familiar micro-prudential regulatory regime.30 An implicit—and erroneous—
assumption behind this approach is that “getting it right” on the microtransactional level will more or less automatically produce the right macrosystemic outcome. To correct this bias, regulators and academics must recognize
and target the macro-level structural factors in their own right, directly and
explicitly.
Second, focusing the inquiry on the role of finance as the engine of
structurally-balanced and socially-inclusive economic development both
necessitates and enables a fundamental shift in the underlying philosophy of
financial regulation. The currently dominant model of financial regulation is
deeply technocratic in character.31 Its preferred methods of operation are based
on identifying and isolating discrete micro-level phenomena and decision points,
and using minimally-invasive technical tools to address specific market
inefficiencies. It systematically prioritizes regulatory solutions based on, and
explicitly justified by reference to, economic theory or empirical data. In this
context, “good” financial regulation reflects judgments that are not only carefully
limited but also facially objective, politically neutral, and technically expertized.
Even decisions with obvious distributional effects are typically framed in the
sterile language of economic efficiency or necessity.32 This implicit bias against
normativity renders financial regulators inherently uneasy with any potential
choices that involve overtly political determinations or require taking aggressive

30. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of the currently dominant technocratic model of financial regulation and its key
implications, see generally Saule T. Omarova, Technology v. Technocracy: Fintech as a Regulatory
Challenge, 6 J. FIN. REG. (forthcoming 2020).
32. Formal cost-benefit rule analysis required or expected from regulatory agencies reflects and
reinforces these dynamics. See generally John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015).
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normative stands. By contrast, re-asserting the fundamental significance of
capital allocation, both as a matter of financial stability and as a matter of
economic development, places normativity at the heart of the regulatory process.
This shift away from the technocratic model of financial regulation, with its builtin micro-transactional bias, creates the vital intellectual space for the emergence
of a more normatively embedded and socially beneficial financial system.
Finally, focusing the academic and policy debate on the dynamic interaction
between finance and economic development, defined in deliberately qualitative
and normatively-grounded terms, brings to the forefront the central role of law—
a macro-level phenomenon—in shaping financial and economic outcomes. It is
difficult to overestimate the potential significance of this shift. Standard
economic concepts and narratives heavily dominate today’s discourse on finance
and its regulation. By recasting legal problems and solutions as mere subsets of
micro-economic ones, the mainstream law and economics scholarship
presumptively subordinates law to economics—thus effectively denying law its
place as a functionally and normatively distinct social sphere.
Recognizing and prioritizing the macro-systemic, structural determinants of
financial and economic development on the regulatory agenda flips this artificial
hierarchy. It highlights the role of law as the principal channel for transmitting
key political and normative judgments, derived through the process of
democratic deliberation, into economic policy. Once we stop relying on an
erroneous assumption that targeting micro-economic transactions is the best
method of achieving macro-economic objectives, it is easy to see why law, in
many ways, comes before economics in both (1) defining these objectives, and
(2) channeling society’s financial resources toward the achievement of these
objectives.
Accordingly, it is now possible to rephrase the title question of this Article in
more explicitly functional terms: “How can we ensure that the financial system
consistently allocates capital to productive non-financial enterprises, for
purposes of facilitating structurally-balanced and socially-inclusive economic
development?”
This core question should drive not only policy-making but also the academic
research agenda in law and finance. Although framing the problem in this way is
bound to generate a wide range of potentially competing answers and policy
prescriptions, it nevertheless establishes an important normative baseline for the
debate. It unifies the debate around a simple but powerful intuition that a
functionally healthy financial system and the healthy functioning of the real
economy are two sides of the same coin.
The rest of this Article unpacks and concretizes this deep interdependency
between finance and macro-economy by focusing on two of its most conspicuous
manifestations. Part III examines the basic dynamics of financial innovation as a
macro-systemic, as opposed to micro-transactional, phenomenon. Then, Part IV
explores the untapped potential of a more proactive developmental strategy to
double as a critically important tool for safeguarding financial stability.
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III
FROM FINANCE TO MACRO-ECONOMY: FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND
PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISE
A. The Unbearable Lightness of Financial Innovation
Financial innovation is a familiar—and in many ways, overused—term in both
academic and popular discussions of finance. A great deal of what is going on in
today’s financial markets is routinely explained and celebrated in terms of
innovative approaches to financial services, processes, and interactions. In a
sense, finance is the epitome of Western capitalist culture’s “ongoing romantic
relationship with innovation.”33 Thanks to continuous innovation, the story goes,
financial markets are growing deeper, faster, more liquid, and more
accommodating of various market participants’ increasingly granular needs and
preferences. Yet, private innovation can (and often does) act as a double-edged
sword that destroys economic value instead of creating it—and undermines the
financial system’s resilience instead of strengthening it.
Complex financial derivatives and structured products are vivid examples of
both the good and bad sides of financial innovation.34 On the one hand, these
sophisticated financial instruments enable far more effective pricing and hedging
of risk. On the other hand, they allow market participants to incur too much
leverage and take on too much risk, often without understanding the full extent
of their exposures. To make things even more complicated, both the sociallydestructive and socially-beneficial consequences of innovation in derivatives and
securitization markets flow ultimately from the same basic characteristics of these
products. What matters is the context, the structural shifts in the markets in which
these products are created and traded. This is one of the key lessons of the 2008
financial crisis.
Another complicating factor in assessing the impact of financial innovation
on the economy is that many so-called innovative financial products and services
are not actually novel. Instead of meeting any real market demand for new
products or services, these financial instruments and technologies simply
rearrange existing solutions for purposes of regulatory arbitrage, tax avoidance,
or private over-leveraging. This is what the former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Paul Volcker, meant when he famously remarked that the most
important financial innovation in the last twenty years was an ATM.35
In short, the phenomenon of financial innovation seems to defy bright-line
definitions and to confound policy judgment. One consistently ignored reason for
33. CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE 51
(2017).
34. See generally id. at 27–31; ERIK GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
(2013).
35. Paul Volcker, The Only Thing Useful Banks Have Created in 20 Years is the ATM, N.Y. POST
(Dec. 13, 2009), https://nypost.com/2009/12/13/the-only-thing-useful-banks-have-invented-in-20-years-isthe-atm/ [https://perma.cc/QU4T-4EJR].
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this apparent lack of normative clarity is the fact that the mainstream debate on
financial innovation approaches innovation as primarily, if not entirely, a microlevel, transactional phenomenon. The analysis is always rooted in the technical
features of individual innovations: how a particular new product is structured,
how it reduces users’ and counterparties’ transaction costs or renders specific
market interactions more efficient for the participants, and so forth. Even the
broader policy-oriented discussions of financial innovation—which gained steam
in the post-2008 era—are typically framed by reference to specific risk-related
consequences and attributes of individual innovative products or transaction
technologies.
As a result, there remains a significant gap in these discussions. After 2008, it
is safe to say that we all generally agree that financial innovation should not
undermine systemic stability and increase the likelihood of another major
financial crisis. We generally agree, therefore, that regulators should take
financial innovation very seriously and engage with this phenomenon in a far
more thoughtful and careful manner than they did before 2008.36
Past that point, however, things get fuzzy, both normatively and analytically.
We do not know exactly what does, and what does not, constitute proper
innovation in financial markets from a purely functional perspective. Was
Volcker’s quip about the ATM right on point? Or is Bitcoin to be celebrated as
the revolutionary breakthrough for all of humankind? Some of us are with Paul
Volcker, and others with Satoshi Nakamoto.37 We do not have a coherent
framework for deciding whether, or under what circumstances, any novel
financial product or technology is likely to be more socially beneficial than
harmful. Accordingly, we do not have a clear basis for developing a coherent set
of regulatory principles for engaging with—that is, understanding, evaluating,
and managing—financial innovation in the public interest.
In order to develop such a set of principles, it is essential that we move away
from the micro-level frame of reference, which emphasizes technical aspects of
individual innovations and obscures potentially difficult macro-level choices and
trade-offs these innovations necessitate. The first step in this intellectual
enterprise is to deconstruct the reigning micro-transactional narrative of financial
innovation.
This dominant notion of financial innovation is an integral part of the broader
narrative of finance as intermediation of scarce private capital, discussed above.38
That standard narrative uses primary markets as the archetypal setting in which
financial intermediation takes place. In this setting, the “savers” of funds—
presumably, real-economy actors who earned and accumulated surplus capital by
producing and selling various non-financial goods and services—are said to
extend loans or invest in the equity of the “users” of funds—presumably, real36. For an insightful post-crisis treatment of the regulatory engagement angle, see generally FORD,
supra note 33.
37. Satoshi Nakamoto is a pseudonym used by the original inventor, or inventors, of Bitcoin.
38. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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economy entrepreneurs or households that need capital to generate or stimulate
production of additional non-financial goods and services. Financial
“intermediaries”—banks, securities brokers, or investment funds—are viewed as
mere middlemen whose sole task is to “transform” all or some of the key risk
attributes embedded in these transactions.39
The key assumption built into this standard narrative of finance—that the
typical user is seeking funds for some legitimate economic use and not for a
speculative financial reinvestment—has profound implications for how we view
financial innovation. It quietly supplies a rigid normative framing for the
discourse on innovation. In this framing, any new financial products or
transaction methods are presumptively good, because they facilitate greater or
better flow of financial capital to the most deserving projects in the real
economy.40
In practice, however, by far the largest proportion of financial exchanges
takes place in secondary markets for trading previously issued financial
instruments. In today’s world, secondary markets in financial assets are far
bigger, more complex, and more systemically important than primary markets.41
And, in the vast majority of real-life financial transactions, market players
borrow and issue various financial claims in order to invest in other financial
claims. In short, unlike one-off primary-market issuances by companies seeking
to fund investments in operating assets, secondary-market transactions are
designed to fund investments in financial assets.42
It is not surprising, therefore, that today’s secondary markets in financial
instruments are the principal sites of both relentless transactional “innovation”
and chronic over-generation of systemic risk. This is both a structural and a
functional imbalance. In theory, secondary markets’ main function is to support
and facilitate primary capital markets by providing liquidity, price discovery, and
risk-shifting opportunities for primary market participants. In reality, secondary
market trading often determines the terms and volumes of primary issuances of
financial claims. A clear example of these inverted dynamics is the explosive
growth of risky subprime mortgage lending in the early 2000s, in response mainly
to the rising demand for such loans as the raw material for mortgage-backed
securities and other sophisticated structured products.43
39. This is what is typically described as maturity, liquidity, or credit risk transformation: a set of
functions typically performed by banks, the quintessential “intermediaries,” and replicated in part by
non-bank financial institutions.
40. This is, of course, a simplification of the standard intermediation narrative, meant to expose its
underlying logic.
41. Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. REG.
735, 758 (2019) [hereinafter New Tech v. New Deal]; see, e.g., WORLD FED’N OF EXCH,, 2017 FULL YEAR
MARKET HIGHLIGHTS (2018), https://www.world-exchanges.org/storage/app/media/research/Market%
20high/lights/WFE%20FY%202017%20Market%20Highlights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RML-NWEK]
(providing a statistical breakdown of annual trading volumes on global exchanges).
42. New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 41, at 757.
43. Id. at 758. See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF
2007 (2008).
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This example also underscores the distorting effect of the orthodox narrative
on our understanding of, and policy stance toward, financial innovation as a
macro-level phenomenon. To overcome the hardy mix of incapacitating
confusion and awe that financial innovation seems to instill in us, we need to
redirect our attention from an idealized picture of capital-raising in primary
markets to the actual dynamics of financial asset-trading in secondary markets—
and to examine these dynamics from the perspective of the financial system and
the broader economy.
B. Financial Innovation Through the Macro-Systemic Lens
The starting point for analyzing financial innovation as a systemic
phenomenon is the fact that most of today’s “innovative” financial products are
produced for reasons that have little to do with capital formation (that is,
canonical capital allocation) in primary markets.44 They are bundles of financial
risks and returns manufactured by financial institutions for sale to other market
participants, such as portfolio investors or managers. From a micro-level
transactional perspective, this is typically viewed as a valuable financial service.
The standard economic vocabulary conveys this normative assessment in terms
of “providing liquidity,” “completing markets,” “discovering prices,” “enabling
diversification and risk management,” or “creating portfolio-enhancement
opportunities”—the familiar language of financial innovation.
From a macro-level systemic perspective, this continuous manufacturing of
financial products results in the continuous injection of privately-created
financial risk into the system. What is missing, however, is the vocabulary for
articulating this systemic perspective as a valid counterpoint to the dominant
transactional view of financial innovation. Developing such a vocabulary requires
a new narrative that explains how, and through which mechanisms, secondary
markets in financial instruments are able to grow and proliferate.
At the most abstract level, the growth of financial markets is best understood
by reference to two interrelated practices: (1) synthesizing financial assets, and
(2) scaling up transactional activity. In other words, both the scope and the scale
of financial markets increase when more products can be purchased and sold, and
more trades can be made in these markets.
The practice of synthesizing financial assets typically involves creating new
types of financial claims out of the existing ones. Common examples include
creating tradable stock indices, writing options on gold, securitizing loans, and
even setting up mutual funds. Here, a relatively small range of traditional
financial assets—common stock, corporate bonds, loans, or commodities—serve
as the base on which a potentially unlimited number of new types of financial
claims are created. Importantly, the standard economic logic of supply and
demand does not constrain this process. An increasing supply of tradable assets

44. This discussion adapts and condenses the argument originally formulated in New Tech v. New
Deal, supra note 41, at 756–70.
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generates an increasing demand for them, which in turn incentivizes more assetsynthesizing. Leverage plays the critical role in enabling this iterative supplydemand pattern.45
The related practice of “scaling up” trading activities further enables the
continuous growth of financial markets. While there are numerous means of
scaling up secondary trading, the development of new transactional technologies
and market infrastructures plays a particularly important role in this process.
Thus, the emergence of sufficiently capacious trading platforms, clearinghouses,
and payment networks enables a far greater number of counterparties to
consummate a far greater number of trades at far greater speeds than they
otherwise could. Standardizing the terms of specific types of financial instrument
is another potent tool for increasing the volume and velocity of trading in these
instruments. Perhaps the best-known example of these dynamics is the success of
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) in developing
industry-wide documentation standards for over-the-counter derivatives, which
effectively unlocked the explosive growth of the global derivatives market.46
Working in tandem, these fundamentally systemic practices of synthesizing
financial assets and scaling up financial transactions profoundly affect the
structure and operation of financial markets. As I have previously observed,
creation of new financial products often leads to the emergence of new specialized
markets. New actors may enter these newly created markets, while the incumbent
institutions may assume new roles in them. New patterns of market concentration and
systemic interdependencies emerge. Via the multitude of specific transactional channels
through which the twin imperatives of synthesizing and scaling up operate, the financial
market grows not only bigger and faster but also more structurally complex.47

So, how exactly do market participants synthesize financial assets and scale
up trading activity? In other words, how do private actors “innovate?”
There are four principal mechanisms that enable financial markets’
continuous reproduction and expansion: what I call “pooling,” “layering,”
“acceleration,” and “compression.” These loosely delineated categories refer not
to any particular type of product or transaction but rather to system-level
operational principles, or embedded system functionalities supporting a wide
variety of individual applications.

45. In that sense, today’s high finance operates very much like a Starbucks coffee shop. The
Starbucks business model is based on the constant invention and marketing of new, intentionally and
carefully differentiated, products that create their own demand. Just like the Starbucks designer
beverages, most complex financial products are manufactured from the same basic ingredients—with
leverage functioning as caffeine that keeps everyone coming back for more. See id. at 761 n.106.
46. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169 (2007)
(discussing the role of standardized ISDA documentation in the development of global derivatives
markets); Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A PathDependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2014) (detailing ISDA’s successful campaign to
secure preferential treatment of derivatives under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, as well as under many
other jurisdictions’ insolvency laws).
47. New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 41, at 761–62.
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Pooling describes the well-established market practice of combining multiple
financial assets that share certain key characteristics, in order to create “a new
set of financial claims backed by, or determined by reference to, the resulting
asset pool.”48 This is perhaps the most ubiquitous technique in finance. Mutual
funds and other collective investment vehicles are products of explicit pooling of
other financial instruments—corporate stocks, bonds, and other claims issued in
primary markets—in a portfolio used to back the issuance of fund shares to
investors. Shares issued by individual funds, in turn, can be pooled in a fund-offunds (FoF) portfolio backing the issuance of the FoF shares.49 Benchmarking
and creation of indices constitute similarly ubiquitous, albeit less directly visible,
system-level methods of pooling securities issued in primary markets for
purposes of synthesizing new tradable assets in secondary markets.50 Among
other things, major stock indices, like S&P 500 or Wilshire 5000, are used as
benchmarks for—and therefore enable the emergence of—a wide variety of
mutual and exchange-traded funds that track their benchmark index values.
A closely related term, layering refers to the technique of synthesizing
financial assets in a manner that creates a chain of hierarchically linked claims,
so that the performance of each new asset layer is determined by reference to the
combined performance of pooled financial assets underlying it. The layering
technique often involves pooling, which makes these categories difficult to
separate neatly. Nevertheless, as pooling is repeated in several consecutive
rounds, the distinct systemic implications of the resulting multi-layered structure
built on the same set of underlying claims become increasingly pronounced.
Examples of layering include FoF and indices, mentioned above, as well as
securitizations and derivatives. In a typical securitization, for example, a special
purpose vehicle (SPV), which holds a portfolio of loans or other revenueproducing assets, issues tradable asset-backed bonds (ABS). These ABS are then
re-bundled with other ABS in the next-layer securitization, such as a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO), which issues several tranches of its own
bonds. These bonds are then used as collateral to back bonds issued in the nextlevel securitization, so-called CDO-squared, followed by CDO-cubed, and so
on.51
Derivatives provide another canonic example of how the layering mechanism
is used both to synthesize new assets and to scale up market trading. Because the
underlying asset is merely a reference point for calculating contractual payouts,
there is no theoretical limit on counterparties’ ability to enter into as many
derivatives contracts as they desire, on any terms that they choose. This makes

48. Id.
49. See, e. g., Fund of Funds, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, https://www.managedfunds.org/hedgefund-investors/fund-of-funds/ [https://perma.cc/23LP-HY65].
50. For a discussion of the systemic function of benchmark prices and indices, see Robert C. Hockett
& Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN. REG. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Systemically
Significant Prices].
51. For more on securitizations, see, for example, GERDING, supra note 34.

BOOK PROOF - OMAROVA1 (DO NOT DELETE)

210

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/1/2020 10:42 PM

[Vol. 83:195

derivatives the ultimate tool for synthesizing a potentially infinite number of
tradable financial products on top of any single underlying asset.
Acceleration occurs whenever the speed of transacting is increased, thus
allowing more trades to be executed. Algorithmic, or high-frequency, trading
(HFT)—a strategy that uses complex algorithms to execute trades at speeds far
exceeding human ability—is an easy example of acceleration. But the
acceleration mechanism also works in less obvious ways, often in conjunction
with the pooling and layering mechanisms. Thus, the very act of synthesizing a
new tradable asset may help to increase the aggregate volume and velocity of
market transactions. The creation of a new asset eliminates potentially significant
transactional costs of placing multiple trades that would otherwise be required in
order to achieve the same economic exposure. It makes trading faster and
cheaper relative to trading in the underlying assets themselves, which in turn
leads to surging levels of trading activity. Indexing, derivatives, securitizations,
and many other financial instruments and market practices exemplify these
dynamics.
Finally, compression refers to the general technique of aggregating and
compacting risk exposures and payment obligations arising under multiple trades
between the same counterparties, thus effectively turning these trades into a
single economic transaction.52 A classic example of this mechanism is netting, a
common practice of offsetting mutual payment obligations of transacting parties
in order to facilitate the back-office process of clearing and settlement of multiple
trades between them.53 By eliminating unnecessary flows of funds and associated
frictions in the process, netting optimizes and reduces counterparties’ risk. By
replacing multiple gross transfers due throughout the day with a single net
transfer at the end of it, netting also enables a far greater amount of trading to
take place. From that perspective, the widespread use of netting and trade
compression has an important, and routinely under-appreciated, systemic effect:
it empowers financial market participants to engage in secondary-market trading
on a far greater scale, and at far greater speeds, than would be sustainable in the
less forgiving world of gross settlement of trading obligations. In this sense,
compression is more than simply a risk-reducing micro-level application—it is a
system-level functionality for scaling up secondary markets in financial
instruments.
In sum, the combined operation of these four transaction metatechnologies—pooling, layering, acceleration, and compression—enables and
explains both the continuous quantitative growth and the ever-increasing
qualitative complexity of modern financial markets. Importantly, these are also
the core mechanisms of financial innovation. Much of what is routinely labeled

52. New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 41, at 765–66. In that sense, it is broader than “trade
compression,” a term of art denoting a common practice in derivatives trading that involves reducing the
number of derivatives contracts while keeping the same net economic exposure. See id. at 766.
53. Netting is also used to offset other obligations, such as those related to posting of collateral
under derivatives or repo agreements.
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as “innovation” in financial markets is, in fact, a product of creative deployment
of pooling, layering, acceleration, and compression techniques in a particular
context or with the help of a particular technology.54 Accordingly, much of it is
fundamentally self-referential: it is innovation in financial markets for the sake of
financial markets.
The “innovative” nature of newly-created financial products and market
practices, therefore, should not be confused with, or reduced to, their narrowly
technical or micro-level transactional aspects. Such an approach produces only a
superficial understanding of what a particular market innovation signifies. To the
contrary, the social value of individual innovations in financial markets should be
determined on normative grounds, by reference to their macro-level impact—that
is, their impact not only on the financial system but, importantly, on the real
economy.55
As the above examples show, most financial “innovations” in recent decades
successfully sought to blunt, or even eliminate, the fundamental structural
constraint on the growth of secondary financial markets: the exogenously limited
volume of instruments issued in the primary markets. Financial innovation
helped to sever the key functional link between finance and non-financial
economic enterprise. Ignoring this macro-level consequence of the unchecked
growth and complexification of secondary financial markets, in effect, enables
the self-perpetuating entrapment of financial resources inside the increasingly
bloated and self-serving financial system.
It follows, therefore, that the task of evaluating and regulating financial
innovation from a systemic perspective requires explicit prioritization of the
potential macro-level benefits (or losses) over private counterparties’ micro-level
transactional gains. In fact, it is easy to stipulate that new financial products or
technologies are designed to produce specific benefits to the transacting parties.
The critical unknown element of any such innovation is whether it would improve
the flow of capital from the financial system to the productive enterprise in the
real economy. Putting system-wide capital allocation at the center of the inquiry
brings into sharp relief the fact that financial innovation is not simply a matter of
financial markets’ internal operation but also a matter of the nation’s long-term
economic development.
Giving financial regulators a clear conceptual and normative framework for
understanding individual financial instruments and markets would help them to
exercise an independent and properly contextualized judgment in their daily
encounters with specific problems in financial markets. Stripping the notion of
financial innovation of its mystique would significantly lessen the potential for a

54. New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 41, at 767.
55. In this sense, the proposed approach deliberately broadens the analytic focus beyond the
familiar discussion of regulatory arbitrage and its role in spurring such innovations as money market
mutual funds, complex derivatives and securitized products, and so forth.
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particularly insidious form of regulatory capture, known as cultural or intellectual
capture.56
A potentially more radical method of operationalizing this explicitly macrostructural approach to financial innovation would be to introduce a system of
mandatory pre-approval of financial products.57 Among other things, a properly
designed product approval regime would provide a procedural mechanism for
ensuring that financial innovation and the creation of complex financial
instruments do, in fact, advance productive economic enterprise and offer real
public benefits—as opposed to merely fueling financial speculation and
regulatory arbitrage.
For example, such a regime could require private firms to demonstrate to the
regulators that each financial product they intend to bring to the market meets
three statutory tests. First, the applicant-firm would have to show that its
proposed offering meets an “economic purpose” test that would focus on the
social and commercial utility of the proposed financial product or service.
Meeting this requirement would involve, among other things, identifying the
actual gap in the existing market that the new offering would fill and the intended
users whose unmet needs this new offering would serve. Second, the applicantfirm would have to pass an “institutional capacity” test that would require a
review of its ability to manage the risks associated with the proposed offering and
to monitor relevant market dynamics on an ongoing basis. Finally, the proposal
would have to pass a broad “systemic effects” test, which would require a finding
that approving the new product offering would not significantly reduce the
overall resilience of the financial system or otherwise raise significant public
policy concerns.58
In essence, this approach would function as a simple burden-shifting device,
by imposing the duty to provide information necessary for evaluating potential
macro-systemic risks and benefits of a specific financial product on the party that
has the best access to such information.59 While not limited solely to licensing of
innovative financial products, this regime would create a critical institutional
space for ongoing collective deliberation on the social function of financial
innovation. Of course, designing a workable regime of financial product approval
is a complex undertaking bound to raise multiple legal, economic, and political
questions. For the purposes of this Article, however, the key is simply to show
how law can serve as a potent tool of restoring a healthy functional relationship
between the financial system and the real economy.

56. See, e.g., James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel Carpenter & David A.
Moss eds., 2014).
57. For a detailed proposal, see Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of
Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 64 (2012).
58. Id. at 67.
59. For an in-depth discussion of various operational and institutional design issues raised by this
proposal, see id. at 113–40.
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Importantly, this relationship can also be restored or enhanced through
policies and institutional reforms directly targeting the process of credit
allocation. In particular, properly designed and implemented measures spurring
and supporting a structurally balanced economic development can have a direct
salutary effect on the financial system.
IV
FROM MACRO-ECONOMY TO FINANCE: DEVELOPMENTAL POLICY AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY
A. Individual Rationality, Collective Irrationality
Expanding the focus of the inquiry into the nature of modern finance to
encompass its functional relationship to the macro-economy helps to elucidate
fundamental dynamics that currently impede efforts both to stabilize the financial
system and to stimulate economic growth. It brings into sharp relief the basic fact
that the persistent lack of success in achieving both of these policy goals is rooted
ultimately in our failure to effectively address the underlying collective action
problems.
Generally, the term “collective action problems” denotes situations in which
the multitude of individually rational actions ultimately produce a suboptimal—
collectively irrational—outcome.60 Financial markets, in particular, are rife with
collective action problems that have a recursive quality.61 Financial asset bubbles,
fueled by short-term speculation and followed by devastating busts, exemplify
this phenomenon. While it is individually rational for each market player to
purchase assets during the bubble phase and sell them during the bust phase,
these mutually reinforcing, individually rational decisions aggregate into
collectively dysfunctional outcomes: financial crises.62
These dysfunctional dynamics directly contribute to the pattern of systematic
under-provision of critical public infrastructure and other public—or, more
precisely, collective—goods necessary to support economic development.63 One
such collective good is so-called “patient capital,” deployed to finance long-term
productive projects like power grids, railway networks, large-scale manufacturing
ventures, and so forth. In effect, the patient capital problem is a special case of
the “speculative-versus-productive-investment” problem. In both cases, the
worry is that investors do not part with their money long enough to allow certain
60. See generally Public Actors, supra note 24.
61. For more on market procyclicality as a recursive collective action problem, see generally Robert
C. Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and
Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1 (2015)
[hereinafter Recursive Collective Action Problems].
62. Id. at 17–22.
63. For a detailed discussion of the distinction between what the orthodox economic literature
typically refers to as “public goods” and the more capacious concept of “collective goods,” see Robert C.
Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment
Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437, 444–48 (2018) [hereinafter National Investment Authority].
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projects to be brought to completion. The chronic shortage of patient capital,
which hinders the healthy growth of the real economy, is simply a version of the
same problem in the context of particularly long-term projects.64 Understanding
the factors underlying this problem, therefore, is the key to correcting it.
For individual investors, committing to being “patient” in terms of getting
their payoff involves significant risks. The longer the time horizon of the project
in question, the more uncertainty private investors face. That uncertainty comes
from two principal sources.
First, in order to make a long-term investment rational for the investors, they
have to be able to rely on the stability of the macro-environment, which they
cannot control in their individual capacities. This includes not just the prevailing
interest rates, but also a wide range of other systemically important prices and
indices, or SIPIs: commodity and energy prices, wage levels, housing prices, and
so on.65
Second, private investors are rationally averse to investing in long-term
projects whose benefits cannot be fully captured by private investors, partly
because they are yielded over time-horizons that exceed biological lifespans.
Certain kinds of public infrastructure that take a long time to develop or
construct, technological advances rooted in long-term investment in research and
development, the long-term synergistic knowledge and cultural benefits of
widespread higher education, and ultra-long-term projects as space exploration
or medical research are some examples of such projects.
Under these circumstances, it is rational for private investors to withhold their
money and divert it into shorter-term investments, especially if they offer higher
returns. Both of these factors—the non-controllability of the macro-environment
and the non-capturability of the benefits—effectively discourage long-term
productive investment in primary markets and instead encourage short-term
investments in secondary markets for tradable financial instruments.66 This is the
essence of the collective action problems pervading decentralized market
economies.
Drawing these collective action problems out exposes the crucial link
between the growing structural imbalances in the capital-starved real economy
and the concomitant growth of systemically destabilizing speculative trading in
financial markets. A self-referential financial system, in which disproportionate
growth on the part of secondary markets encourages heavy speculative trading in
financial instruments, is bound to experience socially destructive asset price
bubble-and-bust cycles. By contrast, reorienting the financial system toward its

64. Id. at 450 n.53.
65. For a detailed analysis of SIPIs as a financial market phenomenon, see Systemically Significant
Prices, supra note 50.
66. For a detailed discussion of non-controllability and non-capturability in the context of the
collective goods provision (or, rather, under-provision), see National Investment Authority, supra note
62, at 448–54.
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primary social function—allocating credit to its most productive and beneficial
long-term non-financial uses—will likely alter its present dysfunctional dynamics.
Understanding this fundamental connection enables us to focus on devising
systemic solutions to the systemic speculative-versus-productive-investment
problem—and do so both as a matter of developmental strategy and for purposes
of maintaining financial stability. Avoiding this collective irrationality necessarily
requires coherent collective agency, exercised counter-cyclically.67 It requires a
particular kind of a market actor: one whose actions are not constrained by the
same dictates of individual rationality that make everyone else herd into the same
type of hot speculative investment, and who is both able and willing to take the
opposite side of that collectively irrational bet. This market contrarian role is
essential to the stable functioning of the financial market, as it effectively
operates as the internal mechanism of dynamic countercyclical self-regulation.
Moreover, it shapes the structural conditions in the financial market in ways that
make such speculative investments not only collectively but also individually
irrational for private market participants.
In theory, private entities can act in a collective agent capacity. In practice,
however, “only public instrumentalities acting directly within financial markets
are fully equipped to perform this critical function.”68 Public instrumentalities’
unique built-in advantages—large size, access to public funding, long-term
investment horizon, legal and regulatory privileges—enable them to take on
greater risk at times when no private market actor is able to do so.69 In this sense,
public instrumentalities are the true “natural” market contrarians. Even the
biggest private firms are inherently incapable of performing this role reliably and
consistently.
So, what might the collective agent capable of correcting the presently
dysfunctional pattern of system-wide capital allocation look like?
B. Developmental Policy as a (Real) Macroprudential Tool
One potential approach to remedying the problems discussed above is to
organize the provision of currently under-provided collective goods as a hybrid
public-private project. Two elements are crucial to the success of such a strategy:
(1) a dedicated public institution, capable of actively managing and channeling
privately-supplied capital into projects that require the patience of a perpetual
transgenerational investor; and (2) a distinct kind of financial engineering that
synthesizes individually capturable returns on investment in collective goods
whose benefits otherwise cannot be captured individually.70
An example of a policy combining both of these elements would involve an
establishment of a new federal instrumentality—what may be called a National
67.
68.
24).
69.
70.

See generally Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 61, at 23–32.
Omarova, supra note 15, at 2523 (citing Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 61, at
See Public Actors, supra note 24, at 138.
See National Investment Authority, supra note 63, at 451.
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Investment Authority (NIA)—charged with developing and implementing a
comprehensive strategy of national economic development.71 This new
instrumentality would operate as a true hybrid public-private market actor,
enabling private investors to overcome currently insurmountable collective
action problems that render investment in long-term public infrastructure
projects individually irrational.
In highly simplified and abbreviated terms, the NIA would function much like
a typical Wall Street asset manager. It would set up a series of collective
investment funds (structured similarly to traditional private equity funds),
actively solicit private investors to purchase passive equity stakes in its funds, and
act as the sponsor and general partner of each individual fund it sets up.72 As with
many private funds, it would require private partners to lock up all or some part
of their investment dollars with the fund for some set minimum period of time.
The NIA would manage the resultant pool of assets much as any private fund
manager would do, assembling a diversified portfolio of promising investment
projects.73
Reversing the fundamental logic of a traditional public-private partnership
model, this new entity would channel the enormous amounts of private capital
held by pension funds, insurance companies, university endowments, banks,
foreign sovereign wealth funds, and other institutional investors into the
coordinated construction and maintenance of large-scale, economic growthboosting infrastructures. Examples of such transformative public infrastructures
would include nationwide networks of clean energy provision and state-of-theart transportation, regional air and water cleaning and preservation programs,
systems of ongoing adult education and technical training, and networks of mixed
public-private startup finance funds.
As discussed above, private investors are often unwilling to finance such
socially beneficial projects, primarily because of the longer time horizons and
higher private risks associated with the provision of collective goods. The NIA
would act directly and proactively to alleviate these risks. By deliberately
exploiting the unique advantages of the federal government—its vast scale, high
risk tolerance, lengthy investment horizons, and direct backing by the full faith
and credit of the United States—the NIA would enable private investors to
capture reasonable gains from the provision of currently under-provided,
transformative collective goods.74
The key to achieving this goal is the NIA’s ability to synthesize privately
payable “equity strips” that reflect otherwise non-capturable public gains from
the provision of collective goods.75 Reaping the benefits of scale economies and
71. For a detailed proposal, see National Investment Authority, supra note 63.
72. See id. at 475–80 (outlining the general structure and functions of the NIA as an asset manager).
73. For a discussion of the project selection process, see id. at 484–85.
74. Id. at 446–58.
75. For a detailed discussion of the specific methods and techniques of financial and legal
engineering the NIA could adapt to this end, see id. at 469–90.
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recapturing positive externalities associated with the nation-wide provision of
collective goods—including the positive effects of the NIA-financed
infrastructure projects on employment and income tax revenues—would
augment the federal government’s ability to offer or guarantee stipulated returns
to private investors in NIA funds.
These synthetic equity payouts would vary depending on the estimates of
local, regional, or national macroeconomic impacts of NIA funds’ projects.76 If,
for example, experts calculate that a particular fund’s investments would
generate an additional three percent in local or regional economic growth over a
certain period of time, the NIA would translate that projected gain into a
corresponding added return for the fund’s limited partners. This method of
synthesizing privately capturable profits would add another potentially
significant source of revenues—on top of project-specific user-payment schemes
for projects amenable to this form of cost-recovery. It would allow the
government to compensate, and further incentivize, those private parties who
assist in the funding of the nation’s economic development.77
In this sense, the NIA would also perform the critical role of an endogenous
financial market stabilizer. By offering yield-hungry private institutional
investors a flexible new safe asset class, the NIA would diffuse potentially
destabilizing demand for privately-issued substitutes and channel it into nonspeculative, longer-term productive investments.78 The availability of this new
asset class can significantly alter the dynamics of contemporary financial markets.
By draining large institutional investors’ demand away from riskier and more
speculative assets, the NIA would dissipate, at least in part, a powerful structural
incentive for private financial institutions to supply such risky assets. In that
sense, the NIA would function as a critically important institutional mechanism
for enhancing systemic financial stability, which is itself a fundamental collective
good.79

76. Of course, the NIA funds’ portfolios would also include projects that, upon completion, would
generate sufficient user-fee revenues to serve as a source of investor returns. The ability to replicate
private returns from the provision of systemically important collective goods, however, is critical for
financing forward-looking infrastructure projects that are not likely to generate sufficient user fee
revenues, or are otherwise not amenable to imposition of such fees.
77. See National Investment Authority, supra note 63, at 477–78.
78. For examples of the growing economic literature on “safe assets,” and government liabilities as
“safest of the safe,” see generally MARCUS BRUNNERMEIER & VALENTIN HADDAD, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y., Safe Assets, (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/
aboutthefed/pdf/FAR_Oct2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7Z2-YGEZ]; GARRY J. SCHINASI ET AL., INT’L
MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHRINKING SUPPLY OF U.S. TREASURY
SECURITIES (Mar. 20, 2001), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/supply/2001/eng/032001.PDF
[https://perma.cc/7M4N-P2ML]; Gary Gorton et al., The Safe-Asset Share, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 101
(2012); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt,
120 J. POL. ECON. 233 (2012); Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Olivier Jeanne, Global Safe Assets, (Bank for
Int’l Settlements Working Paper No. 399, 2012), http://www.bis.org/events/conf120621/gourinchas/
_presentation_new.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VXN-KGBE].
79. Systemic financial stability is a public good insofar as it addresses the non-controllability
problem, discussed above. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

BOOK PROOF - OMAROVA1 (DO NOT DELETE)

218

3/1/2020 10:42 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 83:195

Of course, such an ambitious and far-reaching institutional reform raises a
wide range of complex legal, economic, and political issues.80 Developing detailed
solutions to these problems is beyond the scope of this Article. For present
purposes, the key takeaway is much broader. If thoughtfully designed and
implemented, this innovative reform would open new opportunities for a more
effective channeling of financial capital into productive economic enterprise, as
opposed to socially harmful speculation in financial instruments. In this sense, it
would significantly enhance the long-term stability and resilience of the U.S.
financial system—and blunt some of the key underlying systemic factors that
currently hinder the ability of traditional regulatory solutions to deliver their
intended results in practice. In a holistic fashion, an effective structural
rebalancing of the nation’s real economy would also help to rebalance, both
structurally and functionally, its financial system.
V
CONCLUSION
This Article sought to shift the academic and policy discussions from the
familiar question “Can there be too much finance?” to the bigger and more
complicated question: “What kind of finance should there be?” As the first step
toward answering this multi-faceted question, this Article engaged in an
intellectual experiment, an attempt to explore what a truly effective macrosystemic approach to financial markets and regulation might look like. It argued
that, to be effective, such an approach has to address, in a holistic and direct
manner, both (1) the traditionally technical issues of financial stability and
innovation, and (2) the broader, normatively salient issues of sustainable and
structurally balanced socioeconomic development.
Adopting this approach, however, requires a fundamental rethinking of the
core concepts and assumptions that currently preclude us from recognizing the
deep structural linkages between these two policy challenges—and thus hinder
our ability to formulate a coherent, normatively unified strategy of overcoming
them. This Article outlined an alternative framework for devising such a macrolevel strategy. Of course, there is much more work to be done in order to flesh
out and operationalize in greater detail the ideas laid out in this Article—and to
find definitive answers to the question in its title. It is undoubtedly challenging
but also exciting and necessary work.

80. For an in-depth discussion of the institutional design and implementation issues in connection
with this proposal, see National Investment Authority, supra note 63, at 480–90.

